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ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY LAW AGAINST FOREIGN COMPANIES:
SHOULD U.S. COURTS GIVE EFFECT TO THE
EU DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE?
Kristen A. Knapp1
I. INTRODUCTION
Enforcing discovery against companies located in foreign na-
tions is not a new phenomenon.  The U.S. Supreme Court took up the
conflict between U.S. discovery rules and foreign non-disclosure law in
a 1958 case.2  Despite more than fifty years to reach a settled jurispru-
dence regarding how to enforce U.S. law against foreign domiciled
companies, there has yet to be a clear articulation of a standard appli-
cable in all cases.  Currently, there are two main sets of rules under
which U.S. courts may enforce discovery laws against foreign compa-
nies, and if necessary impose sanctions for non-compliance:  the Hague
Convention and the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The trend
of authority favors the use of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, but there remain some circumstances under which the Hague
Convention is favored.
In 2006, amendments to the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure concerning electronic discovery (“e-discovery”) procedures went
into effect.  These amendments have had and will continue to have a
significant impact on the conduct of business both abroad and within
the United States.  Accordingly, “[m]ore and more companies with
global operations are finding themselves enmeshed in e-discovery that
requires a greater understanding of the issues and laws from a global
perspective” because “[i]t is challenging to navigate and manage e-dis-
covery when you have parent companies based overseas or U.S.-based
companies with foreign subsidiaries.”3
However, U.S. courts have yet to systematically address what
effect, if any, the 2006 amendments will have on enforcement of e-dis-
covery law against foreign domiciled companies, and in particular,
against European companies.  Surprisingly, to date, there is very little
case law regarding the enforcement of e-discovery production requests.
1 J.D., Cum Laude, Northwestern University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Wesleyan
University, 2005.
2 See Socie´te´ Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
3 E-Discovery Issues Heating Up On A Global Basis, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS.,
Sept. 2008, at 19.
111
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\10-1\rgl103.txt unknown Seq: 2  2-DEC-10 15:14
112 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:1
In light of this lack of jurisprudence, legal practitioners have articu-
lated concern regarding “whether U.S. courts will defer to the laws of
other jurisdictions that limit the electronic transmission of informa-
tion across borders and afford greater privacy protections.”4
This paper looks at, in light of the 2006 amendments and the
lack of case law regarding the affect of the 2006 amendments, whether
the enforcement techniques, as applied to “paper” discovery should be
applied to e-discovery and whether there is anything specific to the
nature of e-discovery that necessitates a change in the application of
the law.  Specifically, the paper addresses how the European data pri-
vacy regime may affect the application of paper discovery enforcement
techniques to e-discovery.  The paper suggests that it would be unwise
for U.S. courts to afford the European Data Privacy regime significant
deference.  Instead, the European Data Privacy regime should be
treated with skepticism, similarly to how the U.S. courts have viewed
“blocking statutes” contained in foreign law.  In particular, treating
the EU Data Privacy regime with skepticism will help to prevent the
creation of perverse incentives for companies to store their data
abroad, hoping to avoid legitimate discovery production requests
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by raising the transaction
costs for such behavior.
Section II of the paper surveys existing U.S. law obtaining dis-
covery from abroad, including both the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and the Hague Convention.  The section focuses primarily on
the regimes that have been held applicable to paper discovery re-
quests.  It also details the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the implications for e-discovery.  This section also
contains an examination of how U.S. courts have dealt with “blocking
statutes,” particularly what affect and weight they have been given in
the context of discovery enforcement proceedings.  Finally, the section
turns to how U.S. law addresses non-compliance with paper discovery
laws.
Section III examines the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Law’s
view of International Discovery.  Section IV examines the European
Data Privacy Regime, including how it differs from the U.S. perspec-
tive.  The section also surveys recent litigation in U.S. courts that has
given effect to the EU’s data privacy regime.  Section V compares the
effect of the European data privacy regime with the effect of the “block-
ing statutes” examined in Section II.  Section II suggests that U.S.
courts should decline to give effect to the EU Data Privacy regime,
despite the fact that the emerging trend seems to suggest courts in-
tend to give effect to the Data Privacy regime.  Denying effect to the
4 Jennifer Toole, International Litigation, 42 INT’L LAW. 415 (2008) [hereinafter
Toole 2008].
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EU Data Privacy regime would be beneficial because it would help
eliminate the possibility that companies will use the EU law as a
means to escape legitimate U.S. discovery requests.  Section VI briefly
concludes with a suggestion of how U.S. law might change to address
the concerns of the “blocking statutes.”  Additionally, the conclusion
explores what effect potential changes might have on e-discovery liti-
gation in the future.
II. SURVEY OF U.S. LAW ON OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD
There are two primary mechanisms through which a party to
litigation in the U.S. may seek discovery of documents located abroad:
the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters5 (“Hague Convention”) and the U.S. Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).  Given that there are already two accepted
mechanisms to obtain evidence, the debate in U.S. courts has centered
on what factual circumstances are required to necessitate use of one
method over the other method.  The choice between the two mecha-
nisms is important to litigants because the scope of discovery obtaina-
ble under each method differs.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permit a much broader scope of discovery, including discovery for pre-
trial purposes, than the Hague Convention, where pretrial discovery is
generally not available.6  Furthermore, application of the Hague Con-
vention procedures is arguably more complex than application of the
FRCP, both because the Hague Convention procedures are impacted
by principles of international comity, and because the Hague Conven-
tion procedures are simply less familiar to U.S. litigants than the pro-
cedures of the FRCP, under which U.S. litigants conduct proceedings
regularly.
A. U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
1. Practice Prior to the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Procedure
The default position of U.S. courts favors the application of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for reasons that subpart B of this
section will more fully explain.7  As such, the choice faced frequently
by courts was whether to straight-forwardly apply the Federal Rules of
5 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, available at http://www.hcch.net/in-
dex_en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=82 [hereinafter The Hague Convention].
6 David Epstein, Obtaining Evidence from Foreign Parties, in INTERNATIONAL BUS-
INESS LITIGATION & ARBITRATION 2006, at 11, 13-14 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. 8710, 2006).
7 When the party from whom discovery is sought is not a State Party to the Hague
Convention, U.S. courts have generally not sought to apply the Hague Convention,
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Civil Procedure or whether to apply the law of the country from which
the discovery of documents is sought.
In choosing between the FRCP and the foreign law, U.S. courts
have repeatedly held that foreign litigants seeking protection behind
their domestic law bear the burden of proving that the foreign law bars
production.8  However, although it is necessary for a litigant to show
that foreign law bars production, that showing alone is not sufficient.
Consistent with prior decisions, the court in In re Vitamins Antitrust
Litigation held that discovery requests can overcome foreign legal bar-
riers provided that the requested information is “necessary.”9
The court did not expressly define “necessary” but the context
in which the word is used suggests that the court was thinking of ne-
cessity in light of the concerns of comity,10 as outlined by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa.  A proper comity analysis includes an
examination of five essential concerns:
(1) the importance to the . . . litigation of the documents
or other information requested; (2) the degree of specific-
ity of the request; (3) whether information originated in
the United States; (4) the availability of alternative
means of securing the information; and (5) the extent to
which noncompliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance
with the request would undermine important interests of
the state where the information is located.11
If after conducting a comity analysis a court declines to allow the use
of foreign law to bar discovery, the question of sanctions for a non-
compliant litigant may arise.12
although that option is permitted under U.S. law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b)(2)
(allowing a letter of request to be issued).
8 See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, No. 99-197, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8904,
at *44 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001) (citing In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
9 Id. at *56.
10 Id. at *56 n.20 (stating that “given the significant comity concerns of requiring
disclosure of information that could conceivable [sic] violate foreign countries’ pri-
vacy laws, the Court is wary of ordering such discovery until it is clear that the
requested discovery is necessary”).
11 Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle Ae´rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987).
12 For a discussion of the imposition of sanctions, see infra Section II.D.
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\10-1\rgl103.txt unknown Seq: 5  2-DEC-10 15:14
2010] ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY LAW 115
2. 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The U.S. approach to e-discovery is enshrined in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.  In 2006, the Federal Rules underwent signif-
icant amendments to clarify the scope of their application to electroni-
cally stored information (“ESI”).  The amendments to the Federal
Rules reflect the understanding by U.S. courts and Congress that “the
discovery of electronically stored information presents markedly dif-
ferent issues from conventional discovery of paper records.”13
The 2006 changes to the Federal Rules can be divided into five
categories: (1) amendments designed to provide early attention to e-
discovery issues; (2) amendments to provide improved management of
discovery; (3) amendments to clarify the process to assert privilege; (4)
amendments to clarify application of rules to ESI; and (5) amendments
to clarify the application of sanctions to ESI.14  For the purposes of this
paper, the most significant amendments are those contained in catego-
ries four and five.
The amendments clarifying the application  of the Federal
Rules to ESI are found in Rules 33, 34, and 45.15  Rule 34 was modified
to address the fundamental differences between ESI and traditional
paper documents.  According to the Sedona Group, “[c]ommentators
have noted six major qualitative and quantitative differences between
ESI and printed information: (1) Volume and ease of replication, (2)
Persistence, (3) Dynamic nature, (4) Existence of hidden metadata, (5)
Hardware & software system dependence and obsolescence, [and] (6)
Mobility, portability and searchability.”16
Rule 34(a) addresses the scope of required production,17 while
Rule 34(b) addresses the technical aspects of production itself.18  Rule
34(a) is of particular significance as it governs what documents fall
13 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND Procedure 22 (2005),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/
ST09-2005.pdf.
14 Id. at 26-28.
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 33, 34 & 45.  Rule 33 concerns interrogatories and has limited
application to e-discovery issues.  Specifically, Rule 33(b)(5)(d) contains the option
to produce electronically stored information as a means of producing business
records in response to an interrogatory. Rule 45 is also of limited relevance to this
paper as it addresses the duty of third-parties to produce ESI in response to a
subpoena, and this paper focuses on the duties of the parties themselves. Id.
16 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF CROSS-BORDER DIS-
COVERY CONFLICTS:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO NAVIGATING THE COMPETING CURRENTS
OF INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY AND E-DISCOVERY 5 (2008) http://www.thesedona
conference.org/content/miscFiles/WG6_Cross_Border.
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b).
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within the scope of e-discovery production requests.  The 2006 amend-
ments broadened the scope of the rule, making clear the expectation
that “parties to civil litigation in the federal courts . . . [will] provide
responsive information, regardless of the form of storage.”19   Further-
more, the broad language of the rule, which states that  “any desig-
nated documents or electronically stored information—including
writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings,
images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium
from which information can be obtained”20 are subject to discovery,
makes it clear that all forms of ESI are included within the rule’s
scope, even those that have yet to be invented.21
The amendments to Rule 37 were designed to clarify the appli-
cation of sanctions to ESI.  These amendments are of particular rele-
vance because they govern the conditions under which sanctions can
be imposed for non-compliance with e-discovery production requests.
Specifically, Rule 37(b) addresses failure to comply with a court order
to compel discovery and includes the range of sanctions a court may
impose on the non-compliant party.22  Under Rule37, there are two
significant kinds of sanctions available:  case dismissal and default
judgment.23   Case dismissal is provided for under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(v),
which states that “[i]f a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing
agent . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the
court where the action is pending may issue further just orders . . .
[including] dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.”24
Default judgments are provided for in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vi).25
B. Hague Convention
The Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty that entered
into force on October 7, 1972, whose purpose is to facilitate obtaining
evidence from abroad for use in domestic litigation proceedings.26   As
such, it is an important means of obtaining documents from foreign
countries, but its application is limited to those nations that are State
Parties to the convention.  As of September 16, 2010, there were fifty-
19 Charles L. Kerr, Turbulence Ahead: Adjusting for E-discovery in Aviation Liti-
gation, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 465, 469 (2007).
20 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
21 Kerr, supra note 19, at 469.
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b).
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(A)(v)-(vi); see Erica M. Davila, International E-Discov-
ery:  Navigating the Maze, 8 U. PITTSBURGH J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 5, ¶¶ 64-67 (2008).
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(A)(v).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(A)(vi).
26 The Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Epstein, supra note 6, at *19.
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\10-1\rgl103.txt unknown Seq: 7  2-DEC-10 15:14
2010] ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY LAW 117
two State Parties to the treaty.27  If a nation is not a State Party to the
Hague Convention, the treaty’s provisions cannot be used to obtain
documents located abroad.28  However, if a nation is a State Party to
The Hague Convention, then litigants have a choice of law available to
them.
Unfortunately, the situation is not as simple as referring to the
procedures contained in the Convention.  Although there are fifty-two
parties to the treaty, the majority of these Parties have expressed res-
ervations, either in whole or in part, to the disclosure of documents for
use in pretrial discovery proceedings.29  The refusal to allow requests
for pretrial discovery stems in significant part from the traditions re-
garding privacy that are noticeably different between the United
States and the rest of Europe.30  As a result of the reservations, Euro-
pean nations may lawfully refuse to comply with letters of request,31 if
they believe that the information being sought is solely for the purpose
of locating other potentially admissible evidence.32
A further issue that arises under both the Hague Convention
procedures and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when evidence
gathering is conducted in the home state of the foreign litigant, is the
domestic law of the foreign litigant does not provide for evidence tak-
ing procedures by counsel.  In most civil-law countries, evidence taking
is a function for the judge, and attorneys might not be permitted to
take evidence.33  Under such circumstances, foreign testimony or dep-
ositions may be obtained without the help of foreign governments only
if the prospective witness testifies voluntarily and if foreign law allows
27 For a table of the State Parties, see Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&
cid=82 (last visited September 16, 2010).
28 This statement must be qualified by the fact that Rule 28 provides a mecha-
nism for requesting the help of foreign governments in obtaining discovery abroad
and applies regardless of whether the foreign nation is a State Party to the Hague
Convention. FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b).
29 William H. Baker, Obtaining Evidence:  International Discovery Techniques—
The Taking of Evidence Abroad for Use in American Courts, in INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS LITIGATION & ARBITRATION 2001, at 321, 351-52 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H0-00B0, 2001).
30 See infra Section IV.
31 A letter of request is one of the two methods under the Convention by which a
State Party may request the cooperation and subsequent disclosure of materials
for litigation purposes from another State Party under the Hague Convention.
The Hague Convention, supra note 5, arts. 1-14. The other method by which infor-
mation may be gathered is by the taking of evidence by a diplomatic official or by a
court-appointed commission. Id. arts. 15-22.
32 Id. art. 23; see Epstein, supra note 6, at 13-14.
33 Epstein, supra note 6, at 14.
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the provision of such testimony on a voluntary basis.34  If the laws pro-
hibit even voluntary foreign testimony, U.S. parties will be forced to
resort to treaty to obtain the evidence.35
Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court.
for the S. Dist. of Iowa is the leading case regarding whether a litigant
must comply with the Hague Convention procedures or is free to use
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.36  From the outset, the courts
have favored the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  As such,
most U.S. courts have required that a litigant seeking to use the
Hague Convention rather than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
bears the burden of proving the Hague Convention’s appropriate-
ness.37  The Supreme Court’s holding in Aerospatiale rejected the
mandatory application of the Convention because the language of the
treaty itself is non-mandatory.38  In particular, the Court took notice
of Article 23 of the Hague Convention that allows any State Party to
refuse to execute a letter of request for documents related to pretrial
discovery if they have made the permitted reservation.39
Second, the court in Aerospatiale rejected the mandatory appli-
cation of the Hague Convention out of fear that the Hague Convention
would be misused if its procedures were made mandatory.40   The
Court believed that “interpreting the Convention as exclusive would
lead to the unacceptable result of subjecting U.S. pretrial discovery to
the law of the Contracting State involved.”41  The resulting “imbalance
would hinder the parties’ goal in discovery of obtaining knowledge of
all the relevant facts” while concurrently allowing “foreign companies
and foreign parties to be subject to less extensive discovery procedures
than their domestic counterparts.”42  However, this reason is slightly
ironic if only because by rejecting the mandatory application of the
34 Id. at 15.
35 Id. at 19.
36 Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court. for the S. Dist.
of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
37 In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 52 (D.D.C. 2000); Valois of
America, Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344, 346 (D. Conn. 1997); In re Perrier
Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 354 (D. Conn. 1991); Doster v. Schenk, 141
F.R.D. 50, 51-52 (M.D.N.C. 1991); Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 260
(M.D.N.C. 1988); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 389 (D.N.J.
1987); Davila, supra note 23, ¶ 33.  But see Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH &
Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 40 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Knight v. Ford Motor Co., 615 A.2d 297,
300 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
38 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 529.
39 Id. at 536; see also Epstein, supra note 6, at 23.
40 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 534.
41 Epstein, supra note 6, at 22.
42 Id.
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Hague Convention procedures, the Court heightened the burden on
U.S. litigants (to prove that the Hague Convention procedures were
not appropriate in a given case), a result the court was seeking to
avoid.
Furthermore, the holding acknowledged that the Hague Con-
vention “was not intended to prescribe the exclusive means by which
American plaintiffs might obtain foreign evidence.”43  Rather, the
Hague Convention “was [merely] intended as a permissive supple-
ment, not a pre-emptive replacement, for other means of obtaining evi-
dence located abroad.”44  Rejecting mandatory application, the court
instead relied on comity as a guideline for the application of the Con-
vention’s procedures.45  While the court declined to articulate a spe-
cific comity test to be employed, the court hoped that there would be
“prior scrutiny in each case of the particular facts, sovereign interests,
and likelihood that resort to those procedures [would] prove effec-
tive.”46  However, the court failed to provide potential litigants with
clear guidance as to what factual circumstance would give rise to a
requirement to use the Hague Convention.  Finally, the situation was
further complicated by the multitude of opinions found between the
majority, concurrence, and dissent.
The concurrence suggested that in trying to resolve a conflict
between domestic and foreign law, a court “should perform a tripartite
analysis that considers the foreign interests, the interests of the
United States, and the mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly
functioning international legal regime.”47  In contrast, Justice Black-
mun argued in the dissent that the majority should place “the burden
of proof on the party opposing the use of the Convention’s procedures
and require[ ] first resort to the Convention.”48  The single and signifi-
cant commonality between the opinions, which explains the variety in
the lower court opinions, is that under each potential test the trial
court has significant discretion regarding whether to resort to the pro-
cedures in the Hague Convention.49
The majority’s own test contained several contradictory sug-
gestions.  On one hand, the court cautioned against requiring the
mandatory use of the Hague Convention by saying that “[a]n interpre-
tation of the Hague Convention as the exclusive means for obtaining
evidence located abroad would effectively subject every American court
43 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 535.
44 Id. at 536.
45 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543-44.
46 Id. at 544.
47 Id. at 555 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
48 Epstein, supra note 6, at 24.
49 Id.
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hearing a case involving a national of a contracting state to the inter-
nal laws of that state.”50   This in effect “would subordinate the court’s
supervision of even the most routine of these pretrial proceedings to
the actions or . . . the inactions of foreign judicial authorities.”51  How-
ever, at the same time the Court suggested the importance of U.S.
courts proceeding cautiously and taking “care to demonstrate due re-
spect for any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant on ac-
count of its nationality or the location of its operations, and for any
sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state.”52  Based on Aerospa-
tiale alone, it was far from clear how future cases would be decided,
though even at this early stage there seemed to be a clear distrust of
the Hague Convention because of its potential to subordinate the abil-
ity of the United States to exercise jurisdiction to the whim of a foreign
litigant’s government.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Aerospatiale, U.S. fed-
eral courts justified declining to resort to the Hague Convention proce-
dures in numerous different ways, including time pressures and the
ineffectiveness of the Hague Convention procedures themselves.53
However, concurrently, some U.S. federal courts held that resort to the
Hague Convention was appropriate if compliance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would result in criminal sanctions against a
litigant or when the sovereign interests of foreign litigants outweighed
the inconvenience to U.S. parties of adapting to the Hague Convention
procedures.54
Jumping forward to 2006, three courts rejected litigants’ at-
tempts to require the use of the Hague Convention as a means of ob-
taining documents from abroad.55  In each of the cases, various federal
courts held that resort to the Hague procedures was optional, even
when both litigants were State Parties to the convention.56  In the con-
text of a RICO case, in Jones v. Deutsche Bank the court considered a
situation in which Deutsche Bank refused to comply with a document
production request unless the request was made through the Hague
Convention procedures.57  Further, Deutsche Bank claimed that com-
50 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 539.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 546.
53 Davila, supra note 23, ¶ 35.
54 Id.
55 Jennifer Toole et al., International Litigation, 41 INT’L LAW. 329, 355 (2007)
[hereinafter Toole 2007].
56 See Jones v. Deutsche Bank, No. C 04 5357 JW (RS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14631, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2006); In re Vivendi Universal, No.
02CIV5571RJHHBP, 2006 WL 3378115, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006); In re Flag
Telecomm Holdings, Ltd., 236 F.R.D. 177, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
57 Deutsche Bank, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14631, at *3.
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plying with the production request might infringe on sovereign inter-
ests.58  The court rejected both of Deutsche Bank’s claims, holding that
it was “not persuaded that the burdens on Deutsche Bank . . . that
would arise from requiring it to comply with its discovery obligations
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are such that Jones should
be required instead to proceed under the Hague Convention.”59
This trend of rejecting the mandatory use of the Hague Con-
vention continued in 2008.  Increasingly, courts are realizing that the
Hague Convention procedures are impractical in light of the nature of
modern litigation.60  In SEC v. Sandifur, the court specifically looked
at the length of time it would take to complete discovery under the
Hague Convention.  Although an exact estimate of the time length of
discovery could not be provided, the party requesting use of the Hague
Convention procedures conceded that, under the Hague Convention,
discovery could take up to a year.61  Furthermore, the party argued
that the Hague Convention provided no guarantee of the foreign gov-
ernment’s cooperation.62  Thus, at the end of the one year period the
foreign government could still exercise its right not to comply with the
request, preventing the counterparty from obtaining the desired
documents.63
Although the weight of the authority leans against requiring
the use of the Hague Convention procedures, federal district courts
continue to rely on the Hague Convention procedures in specific lim-
ited circumstances.64  In Metso Minerals, the court found that use of
the Hague Convention was “the only means by which the requested
discovery may be obtained” because the information requested was in
the control of a non-party foreign witness not subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the court.65  Consequently, the court held that the resort to the
Hague Convention is required when it is the only method of obtaining
the information sought.66
In sum, based on the most recent cases, it would appear that
U.S. federal courts strongly favor the use of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure if both the FRCP and the Hague Convention procedures are
58 Id. at *12.
59 Id.
60 Toole 2008, supra note 4, at 438.
61 SEC v. Sandifur, No. C05-1631 C, 2006 WL 3692611, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec.
11, 2006).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Metso Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distribution Ltd., No. CV 06-
1446(ADS)(ETB), 2007 WL 1875560, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2007).
65 Id. at *3.
66 Id. See also In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 (D. Minn.
2004).
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available to litigants.  The trend of authority seems to indicate that
courts only require resort to the Hague Convention procedures when it
is the only method of obtaining the requested information.  The prag-
matic approach of the U.S. courts is consistent with the generally lib-
eral attitude toward discovery in the United States.67
C. The Effect of Blocking Statutes Under U.S. Law
Blocking statutes are legislation that is specifically designed to
prevent domestic individuals or corporations from having to comply
with U.S. discovery production requests.  Blocking statutes prohibit
“the disclosure, copying, inspection, or removal of documents located in
the territory of the enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign
authorities,” and all such statutes “appear to carry some penal sanc-
tion.”68  As such, these kinds of statutes are not looked upon favorably
by U.S. courts.  Although many blocking statutes were enacted in re-
sponse to petroleum cartel investigations in the 1950s, U.S. shipping
legislation, and the investigation of uranium cartels in the mid-
1970s,69 they continue to be applied in all types of modern litigation.
For the purpose of illustration, I have reprinted below an ex-
ample of a French blocking statute, the impact of which has been liti-
gated in U.S. courts.  The statute reads:
Subject to treaties or international agreements and ap-
plicable laws and regulations, it is prohibited for any
party to request, seek, or disclose, in writing, orally or
otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or
technical documents or information leading to the consti-
tution of evidence with a view to foreign judicial or ad-
ministrative proceedings or in connection therewith.70
This particular statute was considered in Bodner v. Paribas,
where the court declined to give the statute effect.71  The court rea-
soned that “the legislative history of the statute [gave] strong indica-
tions that it was never expected to nor intended to be enforced against
French subjects but was intended rather to provide them with tactical
weapons and bargaining chips in foreign courts.”72  In drawing this
conclusion, the court drew an inherent distinction between those stat-
67 See Daval Steel Prods. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F. 2d 1357, 1367 (2d Cir. 1991).
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
n.4 (1987).
69 Id.
70 Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court. for the S. Dist.
of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 526 n.6 (1987) (citing C. PE´N. art. 1A, No. 80-583 (Fr.)).
71 Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 375 (2000).
72 Id.  (quoting Compagnie Francaise D’assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur v.
Phillips Petroleum, 105 F.R.D. 16, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
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utes which serve legitimate national interests and those that were
solely intended to prevent enforcement of U.S. discovery requests.
While the former are entitled to some measure of respect, the latter
are not.  This distinction is significant and its implications in the con-
text of the EU Data Privacy regime will be explored in Section IV.
D. Imposition of Sanctions for Non-Compliance
Socie´te´ Internationale, a 1958 Supreme Court case, is the lead-
ing case addressing the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply
with pretrial production requests that implicate foreign domestic
law.73  Broadly, the case looks at what kind of sanctions are appropri-
ate when a party fails to comply with a production request because of a
competing prohibition in its domestic law. Socie´te´ Internationale ad-
dresses case dismissal and adverse inference instructions, a third kind
of sanction not expressly provided in the Federal Rules.74
In Socie´te´ Internationale, the District Court ordered the pro-
duction of certain records in petitioner’s control from a Swiss Bank.75
The petitioner argued that production of the Swiss bank records vio-
lated Swiss law and could lead to the imposition of criminal sanctions,
including the potential for imprisonment.76  The District Court, de-
spite accepting the petitioner’s characterization of Swiss law, dis-
missed the complaint under Rule 37, holding that “Swiss law did not a
furnish an adequate excuse for petitioner’s failure to comply with the
production order, since petitioner could not invoke foreign laws to jus-
tify disobedience to orders entered under the laws of the forum.”77  The
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision to dismiss the
case, despite finding “[t]hat [petitioner] and its counsel patiently and
diligently sought to achieve compliance . . . is not to be doubted.”78  As
a result of this disconnect, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court found that the District Court was “justified
in drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner,” but not justified in its
decision to dismiss the case.79  The Supreme Court reasoned that case
dismissal was not appropriate because “Rule 37 should not be con-
strued to authorize dismissal of this complaint because of petitioner’s
noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been es-
73 Socie´te´ Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 197 (1958).
74 Davila, supra note 23, ¶ 68.
75 Socie´te´ Internationale, 357 U.S. at 199-200.
76 Id. at 200.
77 Id. at 201-202.
78 Id. at 203 (citing Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et
Commerciales S.A. V. BROWNELL, 243 F.2d 254, 255 (1957)).
79 Id. at 213.
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tablished that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to
willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner.”80  In other words, the
Supreme Court viewed the Court of Appeals finding that the petitioner
had not acted in complicity with the government authorities to prevent
the production of the relevant records as significant.
III. THE RESTATEMENT VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL DISCOVERY
The Restatement81 provides some additional guidance on how
courts might balance the need for U.S. discovery against the prohibi-
tions contained in foreign law against complying with such requests.
Under the Restatement, courts may require a foreign litigant or their
representative to make a “good faith effort to secure permission from
the foreign authorities to make the information available” before pur-
suing disciplinary actions.82  However, before good faith is assessed,
U.S. courts will typically consider five factors in the process of deter-
mining whether a party is entitled to the information sought.  The fac-
tors are:  (1) the significance of the discovery/disclosure issue in the
case; (2) the degree of specificity of the request; (3) whether the infor-
mation originated in the jurisdiction from which it is being requested;
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information
sought in the discovery request; and (5) the extent to which noncompli-
ance would undermine the foreign sovereign’s interests in the informa-
tion requested.83 Particular questions that the courts have focused on
in the past include:  the risk of civil liability that a foreign litigant
might face should it fail to comply with local law,84 the state interest
in requesting or protecting the requested information,85 or allowing a
foreign litigant time to seek a waiver to allow disclosure of the infor-
mation sought.86
In some respects the factors that U.S. courts are directed to
weigh under the Restatement view are analogous to ancient concerns
of comity.  Comity is “the recognition which one nation allows . . . to
80 Id. at 212.
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
(1987).
82 Id. § 442(2)(a).
83 Id. § 442(1)(c).
84 See United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968)
85 See United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976). Compare In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982) (en-
forcing a request to produce documents because the investigative function of the
grand jury outweighed the state interest of the Bahamas), with United States v.
First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that Greece’s
bank secrecy laws outweigh the interest of the United States in collecting taxes).
86 See In re Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 127 (8th
Cir. 1986).
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the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.”87  Nonetheless, as Bennett notes while the concept itself is
clear, there is no more guidance on how U.S. courts are to apply comity
than there is guidance on how U.S. courts are to balance the various
interests under the Restatement view.88
The Restatement also provides guidance regarding when it
would be appropriate for a U.S. court to impose sanctions for non-com-
pliance with U.S. discovery requests.89 In accordance with the Restate-
ment view, “a court or agency should not ordinarily impose sanctions
of contempt, dismissal, or default on a party that has failed to comply
with the order for production, except in cases of deliberate conceal-
ment or removal of information or of failure to make a good faith effort
in accordance with paragraph (a).”90
IV. EUROPEAN UNION’S DATA PRIVACY REGIME
A. General Contrasts Between the U.S. and European Approaches to
Privacy
The United States has developed a very permissive approach to
discovery as compared with other countries, but particularly Europe.
The U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under Rule 26, permit dis-
covery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense.”91  In general, U.S. Federal courts have liberally con-
strued the scope of discovery.92  Furthermore, the information sought
need not even be admissible at trial in order to be discoverable.93  It is
sufficient that the information sought appears “reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”94
87 Steven C. Bennett & Jones Day, Facing the Challenges of International E-Dis-
covery, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY & RETENTION GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUN-
SEL 2007 291, 301 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
11596, 2007) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
88 Id. at 296 (citing Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discov-
ery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 345
(2000)).
89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442(2)(b).
90 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§442(2)(b) (1987).
91 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
92 See Daval Steel Prods. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F. 2d 1357, 1367 (2d Cir. 1991).
93 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
94 Id.
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Conversely, member states of the European Union, such as
Germany and France, take a significantly more restrictive view of dis-
covery than the United States.95  The European member states’ re-
strictive view of discovery, in particular e-discovery, stems from their
conservative regulatory scheme for data privacy.96  The European ap-
proach views information about a person as intellectual property be-
longing to the concerned person.97  As such, the European States view
data privacy and protection as a “fundamental human right.”98   In the
European Union, data privacy is regulated by the European Union
Data Protection Directive.99  In order to comply with the Data Protec-
tion Directive, EU member states have promulgated domestic laws,
which hamper their compliance with U.S. discovery production
requests.100
B. Implications of the EU Data Protection Directive
As briefly alluded to above, the European Union has a strin-
gent data privacy regime, as codified in the European Union Data Pro-
tection Directive.101  The objective of the EU Directive is set out in
Article 1, which states that “Member States shall protect the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.”102
Since EU member states are required to transpose EU directives into
national law, this Article ensures that personal data enjoys a uniform
minimum standard of protection across the EU member states.103
The EU Directive has a direct impact on how companies oper-
ate within the EU. According to George et al., “[e]very company operat-
ing within the EU has affirmative legal obligations to protect the
rights of data subjects.”104 For the purposes of U.S. discovery produc-
tion requests, the EU Directive is relevant because it contains strict
laws regarding under what circumstances personal data may be trans-
ferred from an EU to a non-EU country.105  Articles 25 and 26 are
95 Barbara Crutchfield George et al., U.S. Multinational Employers: Navigating
Through the “Safe Harbor” Principles to Comply with the EU Data Privacy Direc-
tive, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 735, 741-42 (2001).
96 Id. at 742.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 742-43.
99 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter EU
Directive].
100 See George et al., supra note 95, at 762-64.
101 EU Directive, supra note 99.
102 Id. art. 1.
103 George et al., supra note 95, at 750.
104 Id. at 753.
105 EU Directive, supra note 99, arts. 25 & 26.
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worded broadly, and as such, prevent the transfer of information that
would be considered “mundane” in the United States, including such
information as “employee . . . phone numbers, e-mail addresses, and
job titles.”106 Some exceptions to this stringent transfer rule are
granted, but none of these exceptions, which include consent, necessity
for performance of a contract, or authorization of additional safe-
guards,107 seem likely to apply in the context of a U.S. court case.  Im-
agine a scenario in which a discovery request is made to a company
based in an EU member state.  If the production request includes data
that could loosely identify individuals working at the company, even if
the data ultimately sought is not the identity of the individuals, that
data cannot be produced without violating the EU Directive.
C. Recent Litigation That Considers the Impact of the EU Data
Privacy Regime on Discovery
As of the end of 2007, there were no reported U.S. decisions in
which the scope and effect of the 2006 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure regarding e-discovery had been explicitly ap-
plied or discussed.108  One of the major concerns regarding the inter-
national e-discovery is how data privacy regimes, such as that of the
European Union, will impact e-discovery requests.109  There are some
cases that have looked at the legal effect of the EU Data Privacy re-
gime;110 however, none have looked at it in the specific context of e-
discovery.
The court in In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation looked at the
effect of German and Swiss privacy laws111 on the determination of
whether or not to compel discovery.  The German defendants argued
that production of the requested documents, which contained em-
ployee data, would violate Germany’s Federal Data Protection Act
(“BDSG”)112 because such disclosure was prohibited unless the consent
of the individual employees was obtained or another exception within
106 George et al., supra note 95, at 759-760.
107 Id. at 760.
108 Toole 2008, supra note 4, at 438.
109 Id. at 438-39.
110 See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, No. 99-197, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8904 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001); Salerno v. Lecia, No. 97-CV-973S, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7169 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1999).
111 This paper concentrates on the court’s view of the German privacy laws be-
cause they are more directly linked to the EU Data Protection Directive.
112 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], Dec. 20, 1990, BGBl.
I at 2954 (F.R.G.). Although the BDSG predates the EU Data Protection Directive,
it is the national legislation through which Germany complies with the EU
directive.
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the statute applied.113  In reaching its decision, the court sought to
balance several different factors:  (1) whether the foreign law applied
in light of the facts, (2) the penalties for violating the foreign law, (3)
the interests to be served by allowing discovery, and (4) the legitimacy
of the interests potentially to be harmed.114
First, the court determined whether the foreign law claimed to
prevent disclosure did in fact prevent disclosure in light of the facts.
The court suggested that the files were not sufficiently electronic to be
covered by the BDSG, but it did not seem to make a definitive finding
on this issue.115  Second, the court closely examined the potential pen-
alties for non-compliance with BDSG and found that violation of the
BDSG was a criminal offense that carries the risk of a substantial fine
or jail sentence.116
With regard to the third and fourth factors, the court stated
that “disclosure may still be warranted if plaintiffs can show (1) that
the information at issue is ‘necessary’ to protect public interests and/or
the interests of the plaintiffs; and (2) the data subjects have no ‘legiti-
mate interest’ in preventing disclosure of the information.”117  In de-
termining that the information sought was necessary, the court
reaffirmed the application of the well-settled rule that “a party is not
required to accept the assurance of opposing counsel as to what has
been made available. He is entitled to draw his own conclusions on
examination of the papers”118 to proceedings regarding privacy stat-
utes.  Concerning the interests of the defendants, the court agreed that
the BDSG created “legitimate privacy law concerns.”119  Ultimately
the court weighed the factors and held that the privacy concerns com-
bined with the potential for criminal penalties for non-compliance
were strong enough to make the court “hesitant to order these defend-
ants to violate their country’s laws without a better understanding of
exactly what information is protected and how necessary this small
subset of information is to plaintiffs’ claims in this case.”120  Thus, the
court ordered the creation of a privacy log,121 resulting in the non-reso-
lution of the true legal status of the privacy law.
However, more troublesomely, the court in an earlier case from
a different U.S. district court precluded the production of docu-
113 In re Vitamins, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8904, at *44.
114 Id. at *46-47 and *53.
115 Id. at *48-49.
116 Id. at *46-47 & *53.
117 Id. at *49-50.
118 Id. at *51 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algam Ltd. (In re Uranium
Antitrust Litig.), 480 F. Supp 1138, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1979)).
119 Id. at *53.
120 Id.
121 Id. at *53-54.
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ments.122  The court found persuasive the conclusion of the advisory
opinion provided by the defendant’s European Counsel and held that
“the document production sought by plaintiff is precluded by Directive
95/46/EC and the German Act on Data Protection.”123  This decision
contrasts with the decision in In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation be-
cause the European Counsel specifically argued that production was
not appropriate because “safeguards for the maintenance of personal
data within the Unites States are viewed by courts in the European
Union countries as insufficient when compared to the level of protec-
tion provided by European law” and because “there are serious legal
ramifications for those entities that disclose personal information in
contravention of European Union and German data protection
laws.”124
The outcome in this earlier case, combined with the reluctance
of the court in In re Vitamins Litigation to compel the production of
documents, illustrates the significant deference U.S. courts may be
willing to attach to foreign data privacy legislation.  This deference
seems peculiar when compared to the hostility expressed by the U.S.
courts regarding the mandatory application of the Hague Convention
procedures.  In the case of data privacy, courts seem significantly more
willing to bow to the concerns of foreign sovereigns than they do in the
context of requiring the application of the Hague Convention proce-
dures.  This conflict also results in contradictory practical effects.  Due
to the deference afforded foreign data privacy statutes, documents
abroad may escape mandatory production and the documents sought
will not be available for use in U.S. litigation.  However, because the
Hague Convention procedures are disfavored, it is more likely that
document production requests will be enforced under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and consequently the sought documents will
actually be available for use.
V. COMPARISON OF THE EFFECT OF THE EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY
REGIME WITH THE EFFECT OF BLOCKING STATUTES
The current weight of authority suggests that U.S. courts will
not treat law promulgated in light of the EU Directive in the same way
as they have treated “blocking statutes” in the past.  The case In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litigation suggested, though did not state explic-
itly, that the regulations of foreign nations, promulgated to comply
with or affecting compliance with the EU Directive, are entitled to re-
spect in U.S. courts.  This result is further suggested by earlier cases
122 Salerno v. Lecia, No. 97-CV-973S, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7169, at *9-10
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1999).
123 Id. at *9-10.
124 Id.
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from different U.S. jurisdictions, like Salerno.  If this is the case, which
at the moment it appears to be, this would mean that foreign privacy
statues will be given much more deference than was historically given
to blocking statutes.
Privacy laws differ from blocking statutes in one fundamental
respect.  Unlike blocking statutes, privacy laws are enacted to fulfill a
legitimate purpose.  However, blocking statutes are similar to privacy
laws in terms of their practical effect on litigation in U.S. courts.  The
similarity stems from the fact that both blocking statutes and privacy
laws prevent compliance with U.S. discovery requests.  It is for this
reason that U.S. courts must pay particular attention to how they bal-
ance the legitimate interest of protection of individual privacy against
the equally legitimate interest in ensuring fair access to documents in
litigation proceedings.  Are the policy objectives underlying enforce-
ment of foreign data privacy laws sufficient to outweigh U.S. beliefs
behind the policy choice of allowing litigants recourse to a system of
liberal discovery procedures?  This paper asserts that privacy interests
are not sufficient except in rare circumstances.
Although the court in In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation
reached a non-committal result, it clearly placed a significant empha-
sis on the legitimacy of the interests that foreign privacy laws protect,
and while this may be true now it may not always be so.  Although it
has yet to happen, one can easily see how U.S. enforcement of foreign
privacy laws could lead to an easily exploited means of circumventing
U.S. e-discovery production requests, making data privacy laws oper-
ate increasingly like blocking statutes.
Outsourcing data management, processing, and storage has be-
come increasingly common and will continue to grow in frequency in
light of the ever-rising cost of doing business within the territorial
United States.  Furthermore, improvement in technology services and
the global communications infrastructure means that not only is out-
sourcing easy to do but it is now decidedly cheaper.  Because of the
ease of use of such procedures they will certainly be considered for
their practical value, but they may also become attractive solely for the
purpose of circumventing U.S. jurisdiction.
In the future, U.S. courts should not succumb to the temptation
of allowing companies to hide behind foreign data privacy statutes as a
means of escaping U.S. jurisdiction for the purposes of e-discovery.
Succumbing to this temptation would give those litigants willing to
abuse the situation a leg up in international disputes litigated in U.S.
courts.  Furthermore, it would generally frustrate the policy choices
embodied by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically that ac-
cess to more information, indeed all information that is at least “rea-
sonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”
encourages and promotes the discovery of truth through the adver-
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sarial process.125  Instead, courts should reconsider the application of
some disfavored principles in the e-discovery context.
Moreover, there are practical reasons that courts should de-
cline to give deference to the EU Data Privacy regime.  First, giving
deference to the EU Data Privacy regime has the potential to create
perverse incentives for companies.  Although in the long run the pro-
cess of storing data overseas might be cheaper if no e-discovery re-
quests are made, should e-discovery productions be made, there is the
potential for costs to escalate significantly.  The increase in costs stems
from the cost and inconvenience of having to produce documents in the
United States.  Either companies will have to pay for U.S. litigation
experts to travel overseas to conduct discovery in the foreign company
or they will have to bear the cost and inconvenience of transporting the
servers on which the data is stored back to the United States.126
The second source of increasing costs stems from the fact that
the process of deciding which laws apply and how those laws apply is a
significant expense.  The cost of litigating how e-discovery is to be con-
ducted raises transaction costs for companies who elect to store data
abroad.  Since data storage abroad is only cheaper in the long run if
transaction costs are low, unless courts create a body of settled juris-
prudence containing detailed tests to be applied that account for a ma-
jority of factual circumstances, litigation expenses in the pre-trial
phase will skyrocket as parties fight over exactly how discovery is to be
conducted.
Were the courts to provide a more complete and settled outline
of how e-discovery rules will be applied to data located overseas and
how information may potentially be protected by the EU Data Privacy
regime, companies would be in a better position to assess the potential
costs and benefits of storing key data abroad.  Given the current lack
of guidance provided by the courts on this matter, it is difficult for
companies to accurately judge the financial burden of the decision to
store data abroad.
Although resort to the Hague Convention procedures is no
longer the favored mode of proceeding in the paper discovery context,
there are some aspects of the method that may be more applicable in
the e-discovery context.  Concerns of comity may provide a helpful way
of distinguishing between situations under which privacy laws should
be given effect in U.S. courts and those situations in which they should
not be accorded deference.  The fifth concern of comity articulated by
125 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
126 It is highly unlikely that in the course of litigation either party would be satis-
fied if the party whose servers were located abroad took care of the discovery with-
out any independent U.S. oversight to ensure a complete accounting of the data at
issue is provided.
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the court in Aerospatiale—“the extent to which noncompliance with
the request would undermine important interests of the United States,
or compliance with the request would undermine important interests
of the state where the information is located”127 —may provide the
basis for delineating situations.  Those cases where it is clear from the
facts that a foreign litigant’s non-compliance is based solely on its de-
sire to frustrate U.S. interests should not be given effect.  This rule
should hold because it is consistent with U.S jurisprudence declining
to require mandatory imposition of the Hague Convention procedures
when these procedures are more likely to frustrate the ability of liti-
gants to obtain complete and punctual discovery than if discovery was
allowed to proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, this paper does not mean to suggest that there are no
circumstances under which privacy laws should be enforced.  One com-
peting but important consideration was articulated by the Court in So-
cie´te´ Internationale.  As part of the Court’s decision-making process to
impose sanctions against non-compliant foreign governments seeking
to hide behind foreign privacy laws, the Court drew a distinction based
on the intentions of the corporation.128  The Court declined to affirm
the lower court’s decision to dismiss the case, the ultimate sanction for
non-compliance with a discovery request, because the corporation had
not acted with bad intentions or in bad faith.129  Consequently, despite
disfavoring giving effect to privacy law, this paper would not suggest
that the law should be applied against those who have in good faith
complied with the foreign law.  Rather, this paper only seeks to pre-
vent corporations who intentionally subvert U.S. jurisdiction from tak-
ing advantage of European privacy laws to do so.  As such, U.S.
businesses, to avoid being burdened by the skyrocketing costs of pre-
trial litigation over e-discovery production requests, should seek from
the courts a detailed set of procedures governing the wide array of fac-
tual circumstances so that they can properly assess the costs of various
litigation strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper asks whether “paper” discovery enforcement tech-
niques will work in the context of e-discovery.  The answer to that
question is yes, but it is a qualified yes.  Given that within the juris-
prudence on paper discovery enforcement there are two contradictory
threads of opinion, it is imperative that U.S. courts apply only one of
127 Socie´te´ Nationale Industrielle Ae´rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987).
128 Socie´te´ Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
129 Id.
\\server05\productn\R\RGL\10-1\rgl103.txt unknown Seq: 23  2-DEC-10 15:14
2010] ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY LAW 133
these threads in the context of e-discovery.  Courts must resist the
temptation to give effect to European data privacy laws.  Since e-dis-
covery will increasingly implicate data privacy laws, courts must resist
the temptation to give effect to these laws in this context.  Instead,
courts should return to some of the disfavored considerations under
paper discovery procedures and apply those rationales in the e-discov-
ery context to ensure that the fundamental goals of discovery as en-
shrined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are upheld in the
context of e-discovery.
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